We all know how common terminal one liners have became as a installation method on GNU/Linux and what are the issues with it but let's recap quickly.
You go to a pager of some project and it tells you to do curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs/ | sh
or curl -fsSL https://deno.land/install.sh | sh
. The only way to verify that this command will not delete all your files or install malware is to manually review the entire script.
So... why not create a secure script repository? On a central website you would create an account for a project and submit a script. On the other side we would provide a binary client that will download and execute the script (we can call it grunt
from get and run it). So as a user you would run for example grunt rustup
and it would get and execute the script created by rustup project. I imagine it shouldn't be that difficult to add a tiny package to the major distros.
I believe this would be a fairly simple project that would solve all the security issues typical terminal one liners have.
On the website for uploading scripts we could introduce:
- multi user approval flow for script updates
- 2FA
- static checks of the scripts
- reporting system for compromised scripts
verified project
status
On the client side we could:
- provide info about this script's security (how many people reviewed it, when was it last updated, is the project verified)
- provide info about downloads (how many time was this script downloaded since the last update)
- do additional checks (maybe the project could provide MD5 of the script on their servers and grunt could verify it?)
So it would look something like this:
# grunt rustp
Downloading rustp.sh from https://getandrun.it/...
Last updated 30 days ago.
Downloads since last update: 5
Verified project: No
Reviewed by 1 user
Execute script [y/N]
Clearly something is wrong...
# grunt rustup
Downloading rustup.sh from https://getandrun.it/...
Last updated 60 days ago.
Downloads since last update: 5342
Verified project: Yes
Reviewed by 3 users
Comparing MD5 checksum with https://rustup.rs/grunt_md5... Passed
Execute script [y/N]
That's better!
Right? So why don't we have something like this? Or we do and it simply didn't get enough traction?
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So just to address some of the comments. No, it's not a package manager. Package managers are complex tools that handle versioning, dependencies, updates, uninstalls and so on. Package mangers are also distro specific. A lot of devs decide not to use package managers and use bash scripts that are distro agnostic and don't rely on external maintainers and packagers. It would be ideal if everyone used secure package managers but the reality is they don't. This solution is a compromise that offers devs full control of software distribution while introducing decent security.
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Someone suggested brew. How do you install brew according to https://brew.sh/ ?
/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"
See the problem?
There is also no way to verify that the software that is being installed is not going to do anything bad. If you trust the software then why not trust the installation scripts by the same authors? What would a third party location bring to improve security?
And generally what you are describing is a software repo, you know the one that comes with your distro.
I can trust for example rustup but how can I be sure someone didn't hack and defaced their website? You go to a website and see
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh-rustup.rs/ | sh
. Can you say if that's valid? Because it's not. I changed it.grunt rustup
is much easier to verify and it would offer additional checks I described.So it will protect you from webpage attacks but you also don't know how the script uploaded to
sh.rustup.rs
was verified. Maybe the server was hacked and the script was changed? Are you going to check the MD5 manually. You should but will you do it? Maybe rustup team has weak internal security and someone changed this script without proper review process? Central repo would ensure that review was fallowed.And finally, sometimes you don't really know if you can trust the project. Right now you can just take your chance or not install it at all. With central repo you can at least get some stats and you can do some static analysis server side. In the worst case that you will execute something malicious you can report it and it will be removed. Right now there's nothing you can do about malicious install script.
It's not. It's a generic, terminal based installer. Lot's of project use them exactly because they don't want to use software repos provided by distros. Personally I think they should but it's very very common that they don't.
There is no such thing. Every "generic, terminal-based installer" is in reaity a script that was intentionally made to target many multiple distributions.
And do you know what most of them do...? Use the inbuilt package manager of your distro.
That and set up some systemd services and PATHs, sometimes.
You're such a fucking goober.